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1121 
WRITING THE ACCESS CODE: ENFORCING 
COMMERCIAL WEB ACCESSIBILITY 
WITHOUT REGULATIONS UNDER TITLE 
III OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
Abstract: A growing number of private lawsuits allege that businesses are violat-
ing Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act because their websites are in-
accessible to disabled individuals. Courts remain divided, however, on the extent 
to which commercial websites are covered under Title III. Additionally, the De-
partment of Justice has not promulgated commercial web accessibility regula-
tions—adding further uncertainty to the private enforcement regime. This Note 
argues that Title III broadly covers commercial websites, but that private en-
forcement is not positioned to spur lasting, broad-based Title III compliance. It 
proposes that large-scale litigation, state attorney general action, and state laws 
should be used to usher in commercial web accessibility according to globally 
accepted standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Heidi Viens (“Viens”), who lost her vision as an adult, was busy 
singlehandedly raising a daughter and running a small courthouse café.1 Due to 
her disability, Viens had braille lettering on the kitchen microwave, thermome-
ters that read meat temperatures aloud, and carefully sorted food containers 
throughout the café.2 Although Viens’ physical environment was adequately 
modified to accommodate her, her virtual environment was not.3 Specifically, 
Viens could not read children’s books to her daughter on the Scribd online li-
brary platform because it was not compatible with screen readers or other assis-
tive technologies.4 This led Viens and the National Federation of the Blind to sue 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Tori Smith Ekstrand, Should Netflix Be Accessible to the Deaf?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/does-the-ada-apply-to-online-spaces-
too/390654 [https://perma.cc/4L47-5GVG]; Alice Levitt, Blindness No Deterrent to Running Court-
house Café, SEVEN DAYS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://m.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/blindness-no-deterrent-
to-running-courthouse-cafe/Content?oid=2539078 [https://perma.cc/74V7-LQ4L]. 
 2 Levitt, supra note 1. 
 3 Ekstrand, supra note 1. 
 4 Id.; Kristina M. Launey & Minh N. Vu, Federal District Court in Vermont Finds Web-Only 
Businesses Are Places of Public Accommodation Under Title III of the ADA, SEYFARTH SHAW (Apr. 
1, 2015), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2015/04/federal-district-court-in-vermont-finds-web-only-
businesses-are-places-of-public-accommodation-under-title-iii-of-the-ada/. Blind or visually impaired 
individuals use “[s]creen readers, [which] are software programs that allow [them] . . . to read the text 
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Scribd under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that it was 
required to make its platform accessible to the blind.5 
Like Viens, millions of Americans with physical, cognitive, auditory, visu-
al, and other disabilities are regularly excluded from the online economy due to 
inaccessible websites and mobile applications.6 For example, without basic cod-
ing changes and other modifications, blind individuals cannot use screen readers 
or speech recognition software.7 Similarly, without closed captioning, video con-
tent is inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing.8 For these millions of Ameri-
cans, Viens’ case presented a crucial question: whether public-facing web-based 
businesses were covered as “places of public accommodation” under Title III of 
the ADA.9 
In National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Vermont recognized that Congress did not account for the 
rise in the online economy when it passed the ADA in 1990.10 Still, courts such 
as the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recognized a broad 
web accessibility right under the ADA based on its remedial purposes.11 Other 
federal district courts, however, construed the Title more narrowly based on 
                                                                                                                           
that is displayed on the computer screen with a speech synthesizer or braille display.” Screen Readers, 
AM. FOUND. FOR THE BLIND, http://www.afb.org/prodBrowseCatResults.aspx?CatID=49 [https://
perma.cc/FY3R-VW2X]. 
 5 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 567 (D. Vt. 2015); Ekstrand, supra 
note 1; Levitt, supra note 1; see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)) (setting forth the provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which extends broad protections against discrimi-
nation to disabled individuals in areas of employment through Title I, state and local government through 
Title II, and public accommodations through Title III). 
 6 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 567; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of 
Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,658, 28,660 
(May 9, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule] (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
See generally Debra D. Burke et al., Accessible Online Instruction for Students with Disabilities: 
Federal Imperatives and the Challenge of Compliance, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 135, 161–65 (2016) (explain-
ing the breadth of web accessibility challenges and describing barriers to web accessibility that are 
unique to visual, auditory, mobility, and cognitive disabilities). 
 7 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 28,660. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 571; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (setting forth Title III of the 
ADA, which generally requires that private entities offering a range of mainstream goods and services 
to the public must make reasonable accommodations when necessary to guarantee equal access to 
disabled individuals). 
 10 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575; see Farhad Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009, 5:33 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/02/jurassic_web.html [https://perma.
cc/59BW-ZEQM] (noting that, in 1996, just twenty million Americans had access to the Internet and 
used it less than thirty minutes a month). 
 11 See Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (discussing the approach to the question of website accessi-
bility taken by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on controlling prece-
dent); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200–02 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding 
that the web-based video subscription provider Netflix was a place of public accommodation under 
Title III of the ADA). 
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statutory canons and early implementing regulations, limiting it to cover only 
those websites that served as gateways to physical, “brick and mortar” busi-
nesses.12 Notably, even this narrow approach extends Title III to commercial 
websites nationwide.13 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont followed the District 
of Massachusetts’ approach, concluding that Scribd’s website and mobile ap-
plications were covered under the ADA.14 Eight months later, the parties en-
tered into a publicized settlement that required Scribd to comply with Web 
Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”)—a set of technical standards for 
making websites accessible to disabled individuals.15 Although Scribd generat-
ed a workable compliance standard for many commercial websites, some fear 
that it has helped set the stage for a “litigation tsunami,” uncertainty, and ex-
cessive costs for businesses.16 Their concerns are underscored by the fact that 
Title III regulations do not provide any guidance as to how to make websites 
accessible.17 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, private firms have sent hun-
dreds of demand letters and have repeatedly sued businesses alleging Title III 
website violations since 2015.18 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 569 (D. Vt. 2015) (discussing 
how a physical nexus requirement was applied to exclude web-based businesses from coverage under 
Title III); see also Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying 
Ninth Circuit precedent and holding that Netflix was not a place of public accommodation under Title 
III because it was not connected to a physical place). “Brick and mortar” is used to refer to businesses 
with a physical building, as opposed to those that are exclusively online. Matthew Hudson, Learn 
About Brick and Mortar Stores, THE BALANCE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-
brick-and-mortar-stores-2890173 [https://perma.cc/X2RS-TL8A]. 
 13 See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (hold-
ing that the website of the national retailer Target may violate Title III “to the extent that . . . the inac-
cessibility of Target.com impedes the full and equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Tar-
get stores”). 
 14 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 576–77. 
 15 Nat’l Found. of the Blind, Settlement Agreement and Release 2, Nov. 2015, 
https://nfb.org/images/photos/scribd%20settlement%20agreement%20and%20release.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZGL8-HUJ7] [hereinafter Scribd-NFB Agreement]. See generally Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.w3.org/TR/
WCAG20/ [https://perma.cc/EF72-BH6G] [hereinafter WCAG 2.0]. Scribd agreed with the National 
Foundation of the Blind (“NFB”) to a structured implementation schedule under the consensus 
WCAG 2.0 AA web accessibility standard, the designation of an in-house web accessibility coordina-
tor, new corporate policies, NFB monitoring, and annual compliance testing. Scribd-NFB Agreement, 
supra, at 2, 4–5. 
 16 Eric Goldman, Scribd Must Comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, FORBES: TECH 
(Mar. 26, 2015, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/03/26/scribd-must-
comply-with-the-americans-with-disabilities-act/#57ee1943410c [https://perma.cc/L7DG-RBHN]. 
 17 See 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 28,659 (noting that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) abandoned its 2010 plan to regulate web accessibility under Titles II and III simulta-
neously and decided to move forward with a Title II rule first). 
 18 Id.; Sara Randazzo, Companies Face Lawsuits Over Website Accessibility for Blind Users, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2016, 10:54 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-face-lawsuits-over-
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Part I of this Note traces the current private enforcement regime to courts’ 
conflicting website accessibility decisions.19 Part II identifies a consensus be-
tween federal agencies and Congress on the need for universal technical stand-
ards governing how to make websites accessible to disabled individuals.20 Part II 
then examines the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) efforts to codify Title III web 
accessibility regulations.21 Part III discusses how consensus WCAG 2.0 stand-
ards have enabled a second wave of small-scale web accessibility settlements to 
proliferate.22 It also details more structured approaches to enforcement through 
large-scale litigation as well as state law.23 Part IV then argues that courts should 
reject anachronistic constructions of Title III that exclude web-based business-
es.24 Part IV concludes that cause lawyering, state-level enforcement, and state 
law should be utilized as superior enforcement mechanisms.25 
I. RECOGNIZING RIGHTS WITHOUT STANDARDS: WEB ACCESSIBILITY 
UNDER TITLE III OF THE ADA 
This Part presents a tension in conflicting court decisions regarding web 
accessibility, which is due to the fact that Title III’s purposes extend beyond 
the physical world to which its standards refer.26 The potential rigidity of Title 
III’s specific physical access standards was first exemplified by courts that cast 
the Title as limited to physical structures when presented with off-site discrimi-
nation claims.27 Those early decisions recognized a physical nexus requirement 
that has since created divisions among courts on whether Title III covers all 
commercial websites, or only those websites connected to physical stores.28 
Section A of this Part details the tension between general rights and specific 
standards in Title III that has led to divisions among the courts.29 Section B 
                                                                                                                           
website-accessibility-for-blind-users-1478005201 (reporting that there were over 240 Title III federal 
web accessibility lawsuits filed between January 2015 and November 2016). 
 19 See infra notes 31–88 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 95–116 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 117–126 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 139–155 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 132–138, 156–167 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 189–217 and accompanying text. 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a)–(b) (2012) (setting forth broad prohibitions against dis-
crimination designed to provide equal access to disabled individuals without expressly defining “pub-
lic accommodations” as physical entities); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n 
of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that Title III is ambiguous as to whether 
“public accommodations” refers exclusively to physical structures); infra notes 31–52 and accompa-
nying text. But see Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding 
that “public accommodations” in Title III refers exclusively to physical places). 
 27 See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 31–52 and accompanying text. 
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then explains how courts began to guarantee equal access rights to products 
and services offered by mail, phone, and internet.30 
A. General Civil Rights and Specific Accommodation  
Standards in Title III of the ADA 
In passing the ADA, Congress extended an unprecedented amalgam of fed-
eral civil rights protections to the disabled.31 It also imposed an affirmative duty 
of reasonable accommodation on employers, state and local governments, and 
private commercial entities.32 Keeping with a traditional civil rights framework, 
the ADA targets biases against a historically disadvantaged minority to promote 
equal treatment.33 Many of its requirements for implementing civil rights in the 
physical world, however, are highly specific and technical.34 This contrast be-
tween generalized rights and specific standards reveals a larger tension in the 
ADA.35 The ADA’s ends speak in terms of broad rights to non-discrimination 
and equal treatment.36 The means necessary to achieve those ends, however, re-
quire private expenditure and differential treatment.37 For example, the ADA 
does more than just prohibit the local bus company from relegating disabled in-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 56–88 and accompanying text. 
 31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); see Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the 
Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 32 (2000) (discussing early unsuccessful 
legislative efforts to weaken the ADA, which later gave way to an accepted understanding of it ac-
cording to a traditional American civil rights paradigm that garnered immense support). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (covering employment provisions of the ADA under Title I); id. § 12131 
(setting forth provisions governing state and local entities under Title II); id. § 12181 (covering provi-
sions governing public-facing private entities referred to as public accommodations under Title III). 
The ADA was designed to reach all aspects of societal discrimination against disabled individuals. 
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1807, 1808–09 (2005). The ADA has been described as a civil rights “all-star team” because it 
draws on decades of legislative experience by selectively borrowing frameworks including Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and the Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 3601. Id. at 1808–09. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); see Diller, supra note 31, at 40 (noting that the vision of equality ex-
pressed in the ADA is both affirmative and individualized, because it demands unique treatment on a 
person-to-person basis through tailored accommodations). 
 34 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (2017) (laying out barrier removal regulations). 
 35 See Diller, supra note 31, at 40 (discussing the tension between the ADA’s non-discrimination 
mandate, which is rooted in a vision of equal treatment, and the differential treatment that is required 
by its accommodation mandate). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (requiring various forms of accommodation that involve af-
firmative conduct and private expenditure); Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforce-
ment, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 474 (2007) (noting that, unlike racial discrimination, disability discrimi-
nation is often embedded in built environments, meaning that a physical access barrier can have the 
same discriminatory effect as a policy that discriminates against a racial minority). 
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dividuals to the back of its busses—it requires the company to replace its busses 
with new, accessible models.38 
Congress intended the ADA to fight against disability discrimination by 
providing accommodation standards governing the removal of access barriers in 
the physical environment, such as stairs and narrow doorways.39 Congress be-
lieved that the ADA would thereby benefit both disabled and non-disabled 
Americans.40 Specifically, the ADA was aimed at reducing welfare spending on 
disabled individuals in the long term because it would allow them to better par-
ticipate in the economy.41 
In line with its purpose, Title III of the ADA prohibits private entities that 
are open to the public—”places of public accommodation”—from denying disa-
bled persons the “full and equal enjoyment” of their commercial offerings.42 
These entities are grouped separately in an exhaustive list of twelve categories.43 
Each category is illustrated with reference to a non-exhaustive sample of specific 
representative entities.44 To promote the ADA’s broad remedial purpose, the list 
of general categories is intentionally expansive, ranging from dining establish-
ments to private educational institutions and social service centers.45 
The private entities covered by Title III must all follow specific prohibi-
tions on discrimination, which create affirmative compliance duties to ensure 
                                                                                                                           
 38 42 U.S.C. § 12184(a)–(b) (2012). 
 39 Id. § 12101(b); Waterstone, supra note 37, at 474. 
 40 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). 
 41 See id. (finding that discrimination against the disabled rendered a large segment of the popula-
tion unnecessarily reliant on the government and unable to fully participate in the economy, which in 
turn “cost the United States billions of dollars”). 
 42 Id. § 12182(a). The U.S. Supreme Court construed Title III’s general prohibition on discrimina-
tion broadly to capture any denial of “equal access” to a disabled person by someone with ownership 
or control of a covered entity. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676–77 (2001) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 100 (1990)). The commercial offerings covered by Title III are also broad-
ly defined to include “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12812(a). Those subject to liability under Title III in-
clude “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Id. 
In keeping with the findings and purposes of the ADA, the terms “full and equal enjoyment” in Title 
III create a mandate to establish complete equality of opportunity for the disabled—as opposed to 
equality of outcomes. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 101. 
 43 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 100 (noting that the list of public 
accommodation categories in Title III is exhaustive). Some of the categories include: “a restaurant, 
bar, or other establishment serving food or drink,” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B), “a motion picture house, 
theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C), 
and “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental 
establishment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
 45 See id.; Ali Abrar & Kerry J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act Meets the Internet, 44 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137–38 (2009) (noting that, although the 
framework of Title III was borrowed from Title II of the Civil Rights Act, its protections were meant 
to extend much more broadly in order to address the pervasiveness of discrimination against disabled 
persons). 
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that those entities accommodate disabled individuals.46 These accommodation 
provisions require a private entity to change its policies, practices, or procedures 
when necessary to make itself accessible to a disabled person.47 Title III also 
imposes two more specific anti-discrimination requirements on public accom-
modations.48 These two provisions require covered entities to comply with de-
tailed standards contained in the ADA regulations and the physical design stand-
ards in the ADA Accessibility Guidelines.49 
In delineating specific types of required modifications, Congress guaran-
teed rights to physical accommodations.50 This level of specificity, however, is a 
“double-edged sword” because it prevents Title III from being interpreted in a 
more expansive manner such that it would provide more protection to the disa-
bled.51 In instances where required modifications are not specified but Title III 
may still apply, the law only provides that modifications must be reasonable and 
financially modest.52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (2012); Waterstone, supra note 32, at 1817; see Bonnie Poitras Tuck-
er, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 
341–42, 345–46 (2001) (distinguishing the concept of affirmative action as a method of remedying 
past discrimination from the ADA’s affirmative accommodation requirements, which also demand 
differential treatment in order to bring about equality of opportunity). Title III expanded the scope of 
the public accommodations covered by placing most business-to-consumer entities existing at the time of 
its passage under its ambit. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Moreover, Title III ostensibly covers all customer-
facing activities of those entities, requiring that they provide, inter alia, equal access to any disabled 
person seeking to “participate in or benefit from [an entity’s] goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages, or accommodations.” Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 48 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)–(iv). The first provision requires a covered entity to provide “auxiliary 
aids and services[,]” and the second requires an entity to remove “architectural . . . and communication 
barriers that are structural in nature” in order to become accessible to the disabled. Id. 
 49 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)–(iv), § 12204 (requiring compliance with the ADA Accessibility 
Guidelines (“ADAAG”)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2017) (providing auxiliary aid regulations). The 
ADAAG are issued by the Access Board, which is comprised of presidentially-appointed individuals 
with disabilities and the heads of agencies such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
DOJ. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 56,164, 56,164 (Sep. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 50 Waterstone, supra note 37, at 1847–48. 
 51 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of A 
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 510–11 (1991). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). Title III ratchets up feasibility-related defenses to charges of dis-
crimination as its accommodation requirements become more burdensome. Id. With regard to its “auxil-
iary aids and services” requirement, Title III allows a defense where the provision of such assistance 
would result in an “undue burden” on a public accommodation. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). The barrier 
removal provision is qualified by the defense that such removal is required only when it is “readily 
achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 109–10 (explaining that the 
“readily achievable” provision is meant to focus on public accommodations that must implement 
modifications under Title III and to tailor responsibilities based on financial and operational capacity). 
Congress attempted to create a proportional remedial scheme under Title III through a sliding scale of 
compliance obligations based on the significance of modifications and the size of a covered entity. 42 
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A); see Abrar & Dingle, supra note 45, at 139 (noting that the ADA balanced 
the need for anti-discrimination regulations against the cost concerns of businesses). 
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B. Defining Standardless Rights: Applying Title III Beyond Physical Places 
The judiciary has often limited the reach of Title III in the context of claims 
asserting rights to accommodation that are not governed by specific standards 
contained in the ADA or its implementing regulations.53 Specifically, in early 
Title III decisions, U.S. Courts of Appeals divided on the extent to which the 
Title reached past brick-and-mortar insurance offices to cover the contents of 
insurance and benefits policies and the non-public-facing businesses that offered 
them.54 Some of those early off-site discrimination decisions construed Title III 
to contain a physical nexus requirement that, as this Section details, has since 
split district courts on whether the Title covers web-based commercial entities.55 
1. Federal Courts of Appeals Address Off-Site Discrimination Under Title III 
In 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit provided a broad 
doctrinal basis for web accessibility in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Au-
tomotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc.56 There, the court held that 
Title III could require an insurance provider to alter disability-based caps in in-
surance plans.57 The First Circuit thereby reversed the district court’s determina-
tion that the defendant insurance company was not covered under Title III be-
cause it operated out of a corporate office and did not offer services to the public 
at a physical place.58 The First Circuit determined that, even if the term “public 
accommodation” was ambiguous, Congress did not intend that the ADA be lim-
ited to physical places such that the disabled would be excluded from major 
parts of the commercial economy.59 
In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with Carparts that Title III regulated access to non-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 56 Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 
18–19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 57 Id.; see Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(relying on Carparts in support of the proposition that Title III extends to websites, and holding that 
web-based video provider was therefore covered as a public accommodation); see also Nat’l Fed’n of 
the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015) (relying on Carparts and Netflix in 
support of the conclusion that a web-based library service was covered under Title III in a jurisdiction 
where no physical/non-physical entity distinction had been drawn). 
 58 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18–19. The Carparts plaintiff had taken part in a medical reimbursement 
plan for over a decade before he learned that the plan administrator had capped coverage at $25,000 
for illnesses related to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Id. at 14. This limitation in 
coverage directly affected the plaintiff because he suffered from AIDS and was receiving coverage for 
AIDS-related illnesses for roughly two years before the cap was imposed. Id. The plaintiff—who died 
before his case was heard on appeal—was eligible for up to one million dollars in lifetime coverage 
under the reimbursement plan before the administrator imposed the cap. Id. 
 59 Id. at 19–20. 
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physical entities, including websites.60 Like the Carparts plaintiff, the Mutual of 
Omaha plaintiff asserted that his insurance company discriminated against him 
because it capped coverage for individuals suffering from AIDS.61 Nonetheless, 
the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the insurance pro-
vider on the grounds that Title III did not cover the contents of the plans.62 
Unlike the First and Seventh Circuits, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Sixth, Third, and Ninth Circuits held that Title III only guaranteed equal access 
to insurance providers that offered plans at physical locations open to the general 
public.63 The Sixth Circuit paved the way for this approach in Parker v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.64 There, the court held that a third-party provider’s 
long-term employee disability plan was not subject to Title III.65 The court rea-
soned that there was not a public commercial “nexus” between the defendant 
provider and the plaintiff employee because there was no physical location 
where the general public could walk in and purchase the plan.66 The Third and 
Ninth Circuits relied on Parker in holding that Title III claims against benefits 
providers likewise required some nexus between the provider, public customers, 
and a physical place.67 
In its 2002 decision in Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd., the Eleventh 
Circuit expanded the definition of Title III discrimination past the prototypical 
storefront.68 There, the court held that a call-in television game show discrimi-
nated against mobility and hearing-impaired individuals by failing to provide an 
accessible telephone hotline service.69 Relying on Title III’s plain language, the 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1999); Carparts, 37 F.3d at 
19. 
 61 Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559. 
 62 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; see Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that Title III is not limited to physical places); Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559, 561 (citing 
approvingly to Carparts for the proposition that the location “in physical or in electronic space” of a 
provider of goods or services is irrelevant to Title III and that its plain language covers websites, but 
concluding that the Title does not regulate the contents of insurance policies). 
 63 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 
1006, 10142 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 64 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Parker relied on the definition of 
public accommodation set forth in Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., which held that 
a television broadcast offered by a third party was not a service of a public accommodation because it 
was not provided in connection with a football stadium owned by the defendant National Football 
League. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 
(6th Cir. 1995). 
 65 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014. 
 66 Id. at 1010. 
 67 Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115; Ford, 145 F.3d at 614. 
 68 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 69 Id. Hearing impaired individuals requested that the game show provide “Telecommunications 
Devices for the Deaf services” (“TDD”), which would allow them to participate using TDD machines. 
Id. at 1281 n.1. The requested TDD machines would have allowed the hearing-impaired plaintiffs to 
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court reasoned that places of public accommodation were required to remove 
both physical and non-physical barriers to participation.70 The court further rea-
soned that Parker and its progeny did not bear on the claim at hand because the 
television station offered services directly to the public.71 Finally, the court 
acknowledged in dicta that the television show had a physical nexus to the pub-
lic because the show was taped on a set that was open to public audience mem-
bers.72 
2. Divisions Among District Courts on Commercial Website Accessibility 
District courts across four circuits are divided over the extent to which 
commercial websites are covered by Title III and, specifically, whether a website 
must have a nexus to a physical store to be covered.73 A court first applied the 
physical nexus requirement to a website in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Air-
lines, Co., where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dis-
missed the claim of a blind individual who could not shop for plane tickets on 
Southwest Airlines’ website.74 The court based its dismissal on the fact that the 
plaintiff had not alleged a barrier to a physical place.75 The court relied on Par-
ker and the DOJ regulations that defined public accommodations with reference 
to physical facilities.76 The court then defined access to a website as a separate 
                                                                                                                           
receive audio instructions as text on a screen before responding through a touch tone telephone. Id. 
The court noted that the ADA required telecommunications carriers to offer TDD services, which also 
allowed deaf and hearing-impaired individuals to communicate by telephone with hearing individuals 
by sending typed messages to an operator who would then read them aloud. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. 
§ 225(a)(2)–(3)(d) (2012). Other plaintiffs with upper body mobility disabilities asserted that they 
could not participate by phone in the game show because they were unable to rapidly move their fin-
gers as required by the show’s “fast finger process” of recording contestant responses to trivia ques-
tions. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1280–81. 
 70 Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283–84. 
 71 Id. at 1284 n.8. Unlike the Rendon plaintiffs, who sought to directly participate in the defend-
ant’s game show, the plaintiffs in Parker, Weyer, and Ford alleged discrimination on the basis of 
disability arising out of terms contained in the benefits plans of third party providers with whom their 
employers had contracted. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 72 See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 n.8 (noting a physical nexus requirement but not adopting it). 
 73 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of 
the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target 
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. 
Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 74 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. 
 75 Id. at 1321. Access Now was dismissed in the Eleventh Circuit on grounds that it presented a 
theory on appeal that had not been briefed or argued in the district court. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. 
Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the fact that plaintiffs sought to 
categorize the defendant airline as a “travel service” with a nexus to a physical location was not estab-
lished in the record). 
 76 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1317–18, 1320 n.10; 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2017). 
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right not covered by the specific provisions of Title III, which Congress only 
intended to cover physical places accessible to the public.77 Notably, the court 
further reasoned that Title III did not provide an access right to commercial web-
sites offering services to the general public because there are not any statutory 
website accessibility standards to govern the right.78 
The physical nexus requirement was applied to produce the opposite result 
in National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.79 There, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California refused to dismiss a Title III class 
action claim, which led to a settlement.80 The court found that Target could have 
denied the vision impaired plaintiffs access to its physical stores through its 
website—an off-site “gateway” to its brick-and-mortar locations that the court 
likened to the telephone hotline through which disabled individuals were denied 
access to a game show in Rendon.81 The court followed the Ninth Circuit’s phys-
ical nexus requirement in holding that Target’s services could be covered by Title 
III because its operations were anchored to a physical location.82 In keeping with 
the limits of Target, other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have dismissed 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. As an added basis for its conclusion with regard to 
Congress’s clear intent for Title III to apply only in claims alleging denial of access to a physical 
place, the court relied on a decision involving access barriers on a cruise ship. Stevens v. Premier 
Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000); Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. In that 
decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted Title III’s comprehensiveness and the intended breadth of the 
ADA as bases for its conclusion that, although cruise ships were not covered by the terms of Title III, 
otherwise covered entities operating on cruise ships were covered. Stevens, 215 F.3d 1237, 1241. 
Accordingly, although the appellate court had noted that Title III’s intended comprehensiveness oper-
ated to the inclusion of entities operating in a different manner than those listed in the Title, the Access 
Now court relied on its decision for the proposition that Title III’s comprehensiveness operated to the 
exclusion of non-physical entities. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. 
 78 Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 n.13. 
 79 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2002); Target, 452 F. Supp. 
2d at 955. In Rendon, the game show producer defendant did not dispute that the location where its 
contest took place was a place of public accommodation under Title III. 294 F.3d at 1283–84; see 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2012). Nor did the defendant contest that the hotline dial-in system tended to 
exclude disabled individuals who could not hear audio instructions or type rapidly enough to partici-
pate in its show. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). Rather, the game show 
producers argued that the court’s inquiry should have been confined to the question of whether the 
telephone hotline—existing independently from the game show—was a place of public accommoda-
tion under Title III. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283. Rejecting this argument, the court concluded that the 
defendant was covered under Title III because the game show—held in a physical space—was a place 
of public accommodation, and the disabled plaintiffs had properly alleged that a discriminatory denial 
of access occurred off site because an inaccessible “fast finger” hotline system had prevented them 
from participating in the show. Id. at 1286. 
 82 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Target, 452 
F. Supp. 2d at 952, 955. 
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claims against web-only businesses that fail to allege denials of access to physi-
cal places open to the public.83 
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dis-
missed a claim alleging that Netflix provided inaccessible web-based video ser-
vices.84 The same year, however, the U.S. District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts allowed a similar claim against Netflix to proceed—leading to a set-
tlement.85 In National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., a group of deaf and 
hard of hearing individuals from Massachusetts alleged that they were denied 
equal access to Netflix’s video content because it did not include a captioning 
option.86 Rejecting an invitation to generally limit Title III to public facing, non-
home-based entities specifically listed, the court noted that the Title covered ser-
vices of public accommodations; it was not limited to services offered at public 
facing locations.87 The court further reasoned that Congress intended for the 
ADA adapt to changing technology when feasible, and that Title III’s categories 
of public accommodations be construed with broad inclusivity.88 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See, e.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismiss-
ing a Title III claim against a social media website on grounds that no nexus existed between the de-
fendant website and a physical place of public accommodation); Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV 10-133-
M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding that plaintiff alleging a 
denial of access to Google, YouTube, and Myspace had failed to state a Title III claim because the 
websites were not physical places of public accommodation or gateways thereto). 
 84 Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 85 Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201–02 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 86 Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 198. Although Netflix offered closed captioning for some titles 
available through its “watch instantly” feature, many others were not captioned. Id. at 199. Additional-
ly, Netflix did not separately categorize titles with closed captioning on its website. Id. As a result, 
when the website generated suggestions of films for disabled customers based on their prior selec-
tions, it suggested films without closed captioning even if they had previously self-selected films with 
closed captioning. Id. Per the terms of a consent decree entered into in 2012, Netflix agreed to provide 
closed captioning for all of its on-demand video content within two years. Consent Decree § 3, Nat’l 
Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., No. 11-30168-MAP (W.D. Mass. Oct. 9, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 
Netflix Consent Decree]. The consent decree further provided that, within four years, Netflix would 
add closed captions to video content within one week of its being made available on the website. Id. 
§ 4. In 2016, Netflix went a step further towards making its website completely accessible when it 
entered into a settlement agreement with a non-profit disability rights group representing blind and 
visually impaired individuals. Press Release, Disability Rights Advocates, Netflix Settlement (Apr. 
14, 2016), http://dralegal.org/case/netflix-settlement [https://perma.cc/V993-39SW]. Per the 2016 
settlement, Netflix agreed to add audio descriptions—real time spoken narration of visual events oc-
curring onscreen—for a portion of the most popular videos that it offers online. Netflix Settlement 
Agreement and Release at 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, Apr. 27, 2016, https://www.adatitleiii.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/121/2016/04/Settlement_Agreement_FOR_WEBSITEv2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ALH-9HGA] [hereinafter Netflix Settlement]. Netflix also agreed to make its web-
site and mobile applications WCAG 2.0 AA compliant and compatible with screen-readers. Id. at 2.1, 
3.2. 
 87 Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 88 Id. at 200–01. 
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II. PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE: CONSENSUS WEB 
ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS EMERGE BEFORE TITLE III RULES 
Although courts remain divided on the question of web accessibility under 
Title III, the federal government has made strides towards developing national 
web accessibility standards.89 Specifically, federal agencies promulgated indus-
try-specific regulations and attempted to create broader Title III web accessibil-
ity rules.90 Additionally, the DOJ once defined the contours of a national com-
mercial web accessibility standard in proposed rules.91 
A. The Federal Government and Major Industries Adopt  
Consensus Web Accessibility Standards 
Congress and federal agencies have long recognized that disabled individu-
als face a digital divide.92 They have addressed this problem by incrementally 
regulating the public and private sectors—increasingly under the consensus 
WCAG 2.0 AA standards.93 This Section explains the WCAG 2.0 AA standards 
and how they have been adapted to regulate the federal government as well as the 
communications, airline, and healthcare industries over the last two decades.94 
1. The WCAG 2.0 AA Web Accessibility Standards 
Since 1994, the World Wide Web Consortium has endeavored to make the 
web widely accessible.95 In 2008, it published WCAG 2.0 guidelines that are now 
broadly recognized.96 The WCAG 2.0 identify four “principles” for developers, 
under which web content must be “perceivable,” “operable,” “understandable,” 
and “robust.”97 To help developers follow these principles, the WCAG 2.0 identi-
fy specific ways to make websites more accessible, such as providing “text alter-
natives”—written tags that make images “perceivable” to vision and hearing im-
paired individuals.98 Within each of the twelve guidelines, the WCAG 2.0 con-
tains testable “success criteria” through which websites can be measured accord-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See infra notes 101–126 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 101–126 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 117–126 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 101–116 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 101–116 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 95–116 and accompany text. 
 95 WCAG 2.0, supra note 15, at Introduction. 
 96 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 28,662–63. See generally WCAG 2.0, 
supra note 15. 
 97 WCAG 2.0, supra note 15, at Introduction. The WCAG are “technology neutral” because they 
apply across various platforms used on computers and mobile devices. 2016 Proposed Title II Website 
Rule, supra note 6, at 28,663–64; WCAG 2.0, supra note 15, at Introduction. 
 98 WCAG 2.0, supra note 15, at Guideline 1.1. 
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ing to A, AA, or AAA conformance levels.99 Because WCAG 2.0 AA is a widely 
accepted consensus standard, the DOJ considered requiring that commercial web-
sites adopt WCAG 2.0 AA under Title III regulations.100 
2. Section 508 Confronts the Digital Divide in the Federal Government and 
Adopts WCAG 2.0 AA Standards 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits federally funded entities from dis-
criminating against individuals with disabilities.101 In 1998, Section 508 of the 
Rehabilitation Act was amended to create enforceable digital accessibility re-
quirements for federal departments and agencies.102 One year after the Section 
508 standards were enacted, Congress continued to press for stronger web acces-
sibility legislation.103 
After nearly two decades, the ADA still lacks an analogue to Section 
508.104 With Section 508, however, Congress has addressed the growing digital 
divide with a major governmental response to website inaccessibility that serves 
as a guide for the private sector.105 Furthermore, Section 508 illustrates Con-
gress’s considered approach to addressing digital access barriers.106 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. at Introduction. As an example of different WCAG 2.0 conformance standards, level A 
requires closed captioning on pre-recorded video content, whereas the cumulative level AA standard 
requires captioning on live and pre-recorded video content. Id. at Guideline 1.2. 
 100 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 28,663. 
 101 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) (covering Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Christo-
pher R. Yukins, Making Federal Information Technology Accessible: A Case Study in Social Policy 
and Procurement, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 667, 680 (2004) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act laid the 
groundwork for private sector adoption under the ADA). 
 102 See 29 U.S.C. § 794d (Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended); 143 CONG. 
REC. 4660 (1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd introducing proposed § 508 amendments in the Senate) 
(“Barriers to information and technology must be broken down . . . . Let the Federal Government 
provide a good example to the private sector in its efforts.”). 
 103 See 148 CONG. REC. 1125-03 (2002) (statement of Rep. James Langevin) (noting accom-
plishments in the private sector) (“The time has come for us to make our websites accessible to our 
growing e-citizenry. The progress has begun in the federal agencies, and now Congress needs to fol-
low suit.”). 
 104 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Ser-
vices of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 
43,465 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35, 36) [hereinafter ADA Titles II 
and III 2010 ANPRM] (referring to Section 508 standards as a potential basis for forthcoming DOJ 
regulations governing web accessibility under Titles II and III of the ADA). 
 105 See Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,500, 
80,522 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1194) (promulgating regulations regarding web 
accessibility standards and noting possible “spillover” effect in the private sector); Yukins, supra note 
101, at 680 (noting the potential for Section 508 to spur general adoption of web accessibility stand-
ards). But see Abrar & Dingle, supra note 45, at 151 (noting that the Section 508 amendment did not 
spur a major shift toward accessibility in the private sector in the first decade of its existence due in 
part to the lack of clarity of the requirements and defenses). 
 106 29 U.S.C. § 794d; see Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Standards and 
Guidelines, 82 Fed. Reg. 5790, 5791 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. Pts. 1193, 1194) 
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The U.S. Access Board, which sets the standards for both Section 508 and 
ADA regulations, aligned Section 508 with WCAG 2.0 AA standards for web-
sites and mobile applications in 2017.107 As the federal government—the largest 
information technology purchaser in the world—continues with its plan to im-
plement WCAG 2.0 AA standards, it is joining healthcare providers, state and 
local governments, commercial airlines, and many companies.108 
3. Regulating Digital Accessibility in the Communications, Airline, and 
Healthcare Industries 
Congress began to broadly regulate digital accessibility in the communica-
tions industry when it passed the Twenty-First Century Communications and 
Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (“CVAA”) in 2010.109 The passage of the 
CVAA marked a shift in federal policy to address digital accessibility in the pri-
vate sector, after which digital accessibility regulations governing the airline and 
healthcare sectors were promulgated.110 The CVAA aimed to increase access to 
modern communications for individuals with disabilities by directing the Federal 
Communications Commission to promulgate accessibility rules governing com-
munication technology and services.111 The statute was structured to promote a 
shift towards accessibility in communications in part through a multi-stakeholder 
                                                                                                                           
[hereinafter 2017 Final Rule on Section 508] (applying the WCAG 2.0 AA standard to the federal 
government, promulgating standards for Section 508, and incorporating WCAG 2.0 web accessibility 
standards by reference in order to “increase harmonization with international standards”); Yukins, 
supra note 101, at 671, 673–75 (discussing amendments to Section 508 designed to adapt to techno-
logical changes and increase adoption by adding an enforcement mechanism). 
 107 See 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2012) (providing that the Access Board issues implementing regula-
tions under the ADA); 2017 Final Rule on Section 508, supra note 106, at 5791 (incorporating 
WCAG 2.0 standards into Section 508 regulations). 
 108 2017 Final Rule on Section 508, supra note 106, at 5791; see 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (mandating 
nondiscrimination by entities that receive federal funds through the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and 
Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports and Accessibility of Aircraft and Stowage of Wheelchairs, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 67,882, 67,882 (Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 382, 399, 49 C.F.R. pt. 27) 
[hereinafter 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule] (setting forth commercial airline web accessi-
bility standards); NICHOLAS HENRY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 157 (12th ed. 
2015) (discussing the history of the federal government’s information technology procurement pro-
grams and noting that the federal government hosts over 24,000 websites); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 16E.03 (2017) (requiring state agencies to comply with WCAG 2.0); 27 ADMIN. CODE OF N.Y.C. 
§ 23-802 (2016) (adopting WCAG 2.0 AA). 
 109 47 U.S.C. §§ 615c, 616–620. 
 110 Id.; see 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,882 (setting forth web 
accessibility regulations for the commercial airline industry); 45 C.F.R. § 92.204 (2017) (requiring 
healthcare programs that receive federal to maintain accessible websites). 
 111 47 U.S.C. § 617(e); see S. REP. 111-386, at 1 (2010) (discussing the purposes of the Twenty-
First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (“CVAA”) and the need for 
communications accessibility legislation in light of rapid technological advancements). CVAA regula-
tions set “performance objectives” that allow for adaptation to technology. 47 U.S.C. § 617(e)(1)(A), 
(D). 
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regulatory process involving groups comprised of technical experts, industry 
representatives, and disability rights advocates.112 
In 2013, the Department of Transportation (DOT) set forth the first website 
accessibility regulation directed squarely at the private sector when it promulgat-
ed a rule requiring commercial air carriers to implement WCAG 2.0 AA.113 The 
DOT adopted a “tiered” approach to implementation, under which carriers were 
required to take steps towards becoming fully accessible over the course of two 
years.114 Following the DOT’s lead, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) issued a rule requiring implementation of WCAG 2.0 AA on Medi-
caid managed care provider websites in 2016.115 HHS then indicated that all fed-
erally funded healthcare providers offering online services should adopt WCAG 
2.0 AA or the then existing Section 508 standards.116 
B. The DOJ’s Protracted Path Towards Regulating Web  
Accessibility Under Title III 
Although the DOJ has not successfully promulgated Title III website regu-
lations, it maintains the position that Title III requires public accommodations to 
make internet communications accessible.117 The DOJ has filed briefs and 
statements in support of this position in a variety of private actions seeking rea-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See 47 U.S.C. § 615c(b)–(c) (detailing the composition of an advisory committee tasked with 
generating a report on emergency and video programming accessibility). The CVAA’s “clearinghouse” 
provision extends the statute’s reach by requiring that the Access Board and other public and private 
accessibility stakeholders disseminate information regarding accessible communication products and 
services to the public. See id. § 618(d)–(e). Although public accommodations may be covered by both 
Title III and the CVAA, at least one court held that they likely complemented each other. See Nat’l Ass’n 
of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204–05 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 113 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,882; see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1) 
(2012) (exempting air carriers from Title III requirements); 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (setting forth provi-
sions of the the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (“ACAA”)); see also Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, 
Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the ACAA does not contain an implied pri-
vate right of action but rather relies on administrative enforcement). In adopting the rule, the DOT 
rejected the airline industry position that carriers should not be a “test case” for uniform implementation 
of WCAG 2.0 and calls for the agency to delay its rules pending Title III web regulations given the simi-
larity between commercial carriers and many public accommodations. 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessi-
bility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,887–88. A group representing fifty Internet industry leaders sup-
ported the uniform adoption of WCAG 2.0 on grounds that it was “the most current and complete 
standard for web accessibility” and would harmonize with commercial standards. Id. Disability rights 
groups also supported WCAG 2.0. Id. 
 114 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,887, 67,889–90. 
 115 See 42 C.F.R. § 438.10 (2017) (defining “readily accessible” in the context of services provid-
ed by Medicaid managed care programs as compliant with WCAG 2.0 AA and successor versions as 
well as Section 508). 
 116 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,426 (May 18, 
2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). 
 117 Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Tom Harkin, U.S. 
Senator (Sept. 9, 1996). 
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sonable accommodations from web-based companies.118 The DOJ has also en-
tered into agreements that enforce web accessibility under Title III, such as a 
2014 agreement with a major online grocery store that required the store to com-
ply with WCAG 2.0 AA success criteria on its website and mobile applica-
tions.119 
In the last decade, the DOJ’s Title II and III rulemaking activities have kept 
pace with its litigation activity in following the trend toward widespread adop-
tion of WCAG 2.0 AA. In 2010, the DOJ issued an Advanced Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) for Title II and III website regulations following 
a congressional hearing that urged the DOJ to take action.120 In issuing the 
ANPRM, the DOJ noted the need for regulations based on findings that com-
mercial internet companies were not sufficiently regulating themselves, courts 
lacked clarity regarding the breadth of Title III, and businesses were unsure of 
what standards to apply.121 In response, the DOJ proposed adopting the WCAG 
2.0 AA criteria or the then-existing Section 508 guidelines that, at the time, did 
not harmonize with WCAG 2.0 AA.122 
In 2016, the DOJ issued an updated Title II web accessibility Supplemental 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“SANPRM”) that again proposed 
the WCAG 2.0 AA standard that was considered in the 2010 ANPRM.123 Alt-
hough the 2016 SANPRM did not directly regulate the private sector, private 
industry groups weighed in during the comment period, demonstrating readiness 
to adopt WCAG 2.0 guidelines as well as offering more refined comments re-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Hooks v. OK-
Bridge, Inc., 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-50891); Statement of Interest of the United States, 
Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-30168). 
 119 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DJ 202-63-169, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA AND AHOLD U.S.A., INC., AND PEAPOD, LLC UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT § 12(a)–(c) (Nov. 17, 2014). 
 120 Achieving the Promises of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Digital Age—Current 
Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 80, 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
2010 Hearing] (statement of Rep. Nadler); ADA Titles II and III 2010 ANPRM, supra note 104, at 
43,460. Title III’s application to commercial websites was treated as a foregone conclusion, and focus 
shifted to the implementation of website accessibility regulations. 2010 Hearing, supra, at 16. 
 121 ADA Titles II and III 2010 ANPRM, supra note 104, at 43,464. 
 122 Id. at 43,465. 
 123 WCAG 2.0, supra note 15, at Conformance. Compare 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, 
supra note 6, at 28,663 (stating that “the [DOJ] is considering proposing [WCAG 2.0 AA] as the 
technical standard . . . because it includes criteria that provide more comprehensive Web accessibility 
to individuals with disabilities . . . [and] Level AA conformance is widely used, indicating that it is 
generally feasible for Web developers to implement”), with ADA Titles II and III 2010 ANPRM, 
supra note 104, at 43,465 (detailing the WCAG 2.0 as “recognized . . . international guidelines for 
Web accessibility” and soliciting comments as to whether the DOJ should “adopt the [WCAG 2.0 
AA] as its standard for Web site accessibility for entities covered by [ADA] titles II and III”). 
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garding the difficulties of implementation.124 This back and forth regarding 
standards proceeded on a separate track from the contemporaneous wave of Title 
III settlements.125 Nonetheless, the DOJ was working through many enforcement 
and implementation questions addressed in individual suits.126 
III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF WEB ACCESSIBILITY UNDER TITLE III  
AND STATE-LEVEL REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 
Prior to 2015, Title III web accessibility enforcement occurred at a meas-
ured pace through settlement agreements between influential industry defendants 
and advocacy groups or state attorneys general.127 More recently, profit-seeking 
firms have initiated a second wave of enforcement.128 As demonstrated by state-
level web accessibility law and a comprehensive web accessibility law enacted 
in a Canadian province, however, there is a middle ground between scattershot 
private enforcement and complete national regulation under Title III.129 This Part 
discusses how private enforcement of web accessibility under Title III evolved 
from selective, high-impact lawsuits to widespread, profit-driven settlement.130 It 
then examines public enforcement mechanisms based in state and provincial 
laws.131 
                                                                                                                           
 124 IBM, Comment Letter on 2016 Web Accessibility SANPRM for Title II of the ADA, at Ques-
tion 1 (Oct. 7, 2016); Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), Comment Letter on 2016 Web 
Accessibility SANPRM for Title II of the ADA, at Question 2 (Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 ITI 
Comment]; Internet Association, Comment Letter on 2016 Web Accessibility SANPRM for Title II of 
the ADA, at 2 (Oct. 7, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Internet Association Comment]. Among other sugges-
tions, commenters proposed extended compliance timelines—such as a two-year deadline for WCAG 2.0 
A followed by a three-year deadline for 2.0 AA—as well as a uniform automated compliance testing tool, 
and a carve out for mobile applications. See, e.g., 2016 Internet Association Comment, supra, at 4A, 
5B, 6. 
 125 See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text. 
 126 Compare 2016 Internet Association Comment, supra note 124, at 4A (discussing the need for 
training and institutionalization of web accessibility), with Scribd-NFB Agreement, supra note 15, at 
5 (providing for in-house web accessibility policies and training programs). 
 127 See infra notes 132–138 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Class Settlement Agreement and 
Release at § 1, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C 
06-01802 MHP) (agreeing to implement accessibility on retailer’s website); Press Release, Office of 
the Mass. Att’y Gen., Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley and the National Federation of the Blind Reach 
Agreement with Apple, Inc. to Improve Accessibility of iTunes (Sept. 26, 2008), http://
www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2008/ag-and-national-federation-of-the-blind-
reach.html [https://perma.cc/4BMV-AJKK] [hereinafter Apple Settlement] (announcing collaborative 
web accessibility agreement reached between the Massachusetts Attorney General, the National Fed-
eration of the Blind, and Apple, Inc.). 
 128 See infra notes 139–155 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 157–167 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 132–155 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 157–167 and accompanying text. 
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A. Impact Actions by Disability Cause Lawyers and State Attorneys General 
Disability cause lawyers use litigation—or the threat of litigation—against 
industry stakeholders to increase recognition of disability rights.132 In the Title 
III commercial website context, cause lawyers seek to compel businesses to in-
stitutionalize web accessibility policies according to sophisticated, public settle-
ment agreements.133 For example, a 2016 settlement agreement required ETrade 
Financial to adopt the WCAG 2.0 AA guidelines and implement them on its 
website and mobile applications according to a detailed schedule.134 It also re-
quired institutionalization through policies and in-house training.135 
Like cause lawyers, state attorneys general have achieved agreements im-
plementing sophisticated web accessibility compliance practices with a high de-
gree of accountability on an industry-specific basis.136 For instance, attorneys 
general in Massachusetts and New York have launched public ADA investiga-
tions, spurring web accessibility compliance among industry leaders.137 Subject 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Michael E. Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 
1293–94 (2012). For example, disability cause lawyers brought a web accessibility suit against Target in 
2006. Class Settlement Agreement and Release, supra note 127, § 1. After the plaintiff class prevailed, 
a study of large national retailers found that the case likely led to industry-wide compliance efforts. Jona-
than Frank, Web Accessibility for the Blind: Corporate Social Responsibility or Litigation Avoid-
ance?, PROC. OF THE 41ST HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 1, 5 (2008). 
 133 Waterstone et al., supra note 132, at 1316. In order to generate long-term, replicable compli-
ance models, cause lawyers have framed accessibility for disabled individuals as an extension of com-
panies’ pre-existing cultures while negotiating with them. Id. The two web accessibility agreements 
reached with Netflix in 2012 and 2016 demonstrate that collaborative implementation and positive 
publicity can lead to future adoption by an industry leader. See Dara Kerr, Netflix and Deaf-Rights 
Group Settle Suit Over Video Captions, CNET (Oct. 11, 2012, 6:21 PM), https://www.cnet.com/
news/netflix-and-deaf-rights-group-settle-suit-over-video-captions [https://perma.cc/4B5Y-T7TL] 
(quoting Netflix’s Chief Product Officer, who stated after the 2012 agreement that Netflix was “the 
industry leader” in providing accessible content and expressed the company’s desire to set a bench-
mark). 
 134 Press Release, Law Office of Lainey Feingold, ETrade Digital Accessibility Settlement 
Agreement, at Exs. A, C §§ 3.6, 4.1, 7 (June 21, 2016), http://www.lflegal.com/2016/06/etrade-
agreement/ [https://perma.cc/3BQD-DVJQ] [hereinafter ETrade Settlement]. 
 135 Id. Similar training provisions bound Scribd, H&R Block, and Sweetgreen to implement WCAG 
2.0 AA on their websites and mobile applications. Settlement Agreement, §§ 6–9, Farmer v. Sweet-
green, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02103-AJN (S.D.N.Y. 2017) [hereinafter Sweetgreen Settlement]; Scribd-
NFB Agreement, supra note 15, at 2, 4–5; Consent Decree, §§ 12–15, 18, 20, 23, Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind v. HRB Dig. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-10799-GAO (D. Mass. 2014) [hereinafter HRB Consent De-
cree]. 
 136 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Secures Ground-
breaking Nationwide Agreement with HSBC Credit Card to Deliver Services to Customers with Disabili-
ties (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-secures-
groundbreaking-nationwide-agreement-hsbc-credit-card [https://perma.cc/96HJ-7WLE] [hereinafter 
HSBC Settlement] (implementing web accessibility policies for disabled customers of credit card 
services provider). 
 137 Apple Settlement, supra note 127; HSBC Settlement, supra note 136; Press Release, Office of 
Mass. Att’y Gen., Monster.com First in Industry to Make Website Accessible for Blind Users (Jan. 
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to public scrutiny and the possibility of costly enforcement, one corporation tar-
geted by the New York attorney general began championing the web accessibil-
ity cause, paying investigation expenses, and donating to disability rights organi-
zations.138 
B. Second-Wave Web Accessibility Enforcement: Scattershot Settlements 
As the consensus regarding the WCAG 2.0 standard has grown, there has 
been a spike in private web accessibility suits and demand letters.139 These pri-
vate enforcement actions benefited from the earlier institutional settlements be-
cause they created effective templates for WCAG 2.0 enforcement agree-
ments.140 In fact, many of these private enforcement agreements specifically ref-
erence the terms of major DOJ and advocacy group settlement agreements as 
articulating universal compliance standards under WCAG 2.0 AA.141 Although 
the spread of small scale web accessibility settlements stands to increase acces-
sibility, it exhibits characteristics of a fee-driven, “serial” enforcement pattern 
that repeat-player firms use to seek a high volume of duplicative settlements.142 
                                                                                                                           
30, 2013), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2013/2013-01-30-monster-
agreement.html [https://perma.cc/E7H6-WDAZ] [hereinafter Monster Settlement]. 
 138 Monster Settlement, supra note 137; Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen., Spitzer 
Agreement to Make Web Sites Accessible to the Blind and Visually Impaired (Aug. 19, 2004), http://
www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/spitzer-agreement-make-web-sites-accessible-blind-and-visually-
impaired [https://perma.cc/8EJZ-2AMQ] [hereinafter Hotel Settlement] (discussing how investiga-
tions conducted by a specialized Internet Bureau within the Office of the New York Attorney General 
spurred Ramada.com and Priceline.com to “work[] cooperatively and creatively . . . to correct the 
issues” pursuant to standards set forth by the group that created the WCAG and in collaboration with 
disability rights groups). 
 139 Randazzo, supra note 18; see Minh N. Vu, Federal Website Lawsuits Spike; Community 
Banks Get Demand Letters, SEYFARTH SHAW (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2016/10/
federal-website-lawsuits-spike-community-banks-get-demand-letters/ [https://perma.cc/L6S5-CLFM] 
(documenting increases in website accessibility private enforcement actions by industry); Minh N. Vu 
et al., ADA Title III Lawsuits Up 63% from 2015, SEYFARTH SHAW (July 26, 2016), http://www.
adatitleiii.com/2016/07/ada-title-iii-lawsuits-up-63-from-2015 [https://perma.cc/7VZA-HLGB] (not-
ing that website accessibility suits accounted in part for an overall year-over-year rise in Title III ac-
tions). 
 140 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, Al-
ternatively, to Stay This Action at 10–12, Sipe v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2015 WL 10057783 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 17, 2015) (No. 2:15-cv-01083-AJS) [hereinafter Sipe Complaint] (relying on prior web ac-
cessibility litigation that led to the implementation of WCAG 2.0 AA success criteria as well as DOJ 
rulemaking to assert a consensus standard under Title III). 
 141 Sipe Complaint, supra note 140, at 10–12; see Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 2–3, 
Omahasteaks.com, Inc. v. Access Now, Inc., 2017 WL 1154031 (D. Neb. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 17-cv-
60) [hereinafter Omaha Steaks Complaint] (noting that a demand letter sent by a Florida non-profit 
group representing disabled individuals asserted that the defendant violated Title III of the ADA be-
cause its website did not comply with WCAG 2.0). 
 142 See Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 2–3 (averring that an out-of-state non-profit 
sent a demand letter threatening “immediate” legal action if a business did not enter into a confidential 
settlement agreement requiring its website to comply with WCAG 2.0); Complaint at Ex. 1, at 3, 7–8, 
Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. v. Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela LLP, No. 16-cv-1438 (C.D. Cal. 
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In general, Title III enforcement actions can only be brought by disabled 
individuals who are directly discriminated against, and the incentives for bring-
ing these suits are low.143 Under Title III, remedies are limited to injunctive relief 
and attorneys’ fees.144 Only a small minority of states provide money damages 
for violations of Title III or state disability laws.145 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the ADA’s fee-shifting provision to foreclose awards of attor-
neys’ fees when ADA compliance is achieved before a judicial decision or en-
forceable settlement agreement is reached.146 Consequently, there is a low pro-
spect of compensation associated with litigation.147 
The relatively small price-tag associated with a Title III violation and the 
unlikelihood of suit may make it rational for defendants to take a “wait and set-
tle” approach.148 Furthermore, Title III’s limited remedies have led to the prolif-
eration of low-value “serial” litigation practices, where firms seek numerous 
settlements with minimal deterrent effect.149 Serial litigation has succeeded as a 
method for repeat-player plaintiffs’ firms to make Title III litigation profitable by 
                                                                                                                           
Mar. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Harbor Freight Complaint] (warning a business in a demand letter of a 
lawsuit for failure to comply with WCAG 2.0 and proposing that the business respond within twenty-
one days and enter into confidential agreements covering implementation and attorney’s fees); 
Randazzo, supra note 18 (discussing an increase in small-scale, fee-driven website accessibility litiga-
tion in 2015 and noting that serial web accessibility actions by repeat-player firms “are a legal-fee 
shakedown and don’t help improve accessibility”). 
 143 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a)(2), 12205 (2012). 
 144 See id. § 12188(a)(2) (Title III enforcement mechanism); id. § 12188(b) (authorizing the At-
torney General to initiate Title III compliance actions through which civil penalties can assessed in the 
amount of $50,000 to $100,000 per violation); id. § 12205 (attorneys’ fees provision). Under Title 
III’s enforcement provision, the Attorney General is tasked with investigating complaints brought 
under the Title. Id. § 12188(b)(1)(A). However, the DOJ has not possessed the resources necessary to 
conduct widespread investigations, which has increased the importance of private enforcement. Sam-
uel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Liti-
gation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2006). 
 145 Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 380 
(2000); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 2017) (providing for an award of $4000 per occurrence of 
disability discrimination). 
 146 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 601–02, 605 (2001) (rejecting a generally accepted “catalyst” theory which had allowed awards 
of attorneys’ fees when the initiation of civil rights actions spurred voluntary changes without formal 
judicial intervention); see also Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 11–12 (noting that the possibility of a 
defendant being held liable under Title III after voluntarily coming into compliance is limited because 
continuing violations are unlikely to recur in that circumstance, meaning that a plaintiff would lack 
standing to sue). 
 147 Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 11–12. 
 148 Id.; see Casey L. Raymond, A Growing Threat to the ADA: An Empirical Study of Mass Fil-
ings, Popular Backlash, and Potential Solutions Under Titles II and III, 18 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 235, 
254 (2013) (noting that proactive compliance with Title III may appear economically irrational to 
businesses given the low cost of settlement and the low probability of suit). 
 149 See Raymond, supra note 148, at 253–54 (discussing the example of a single attorney “who 
filed 740 lawsuits in less than four years . . . [,] settl[ing] most cases out of court for $3,000 to $5,000 
in fees, along with agreements to become ADA-compliant”). 
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amassing scores of low-cost settlements with businesses that want to avoid pay-
ing those firms’ attorneys’ fees.150 Because defendants can avoid paying attor-
neys’ fees by taking steps to comply with the ADA, serial litigators race to sur-
prise defendants before they are aware of—or before they have begun to reme-
dy—ADA non-compliance.151 
Serial litigation accounts for many of the Title III claims over the last dec-
ade, including more recent claims regarding website accessibility.152 Serial filing 
is an attractive tactic for website accessibility claims because of widespread non-
compliance, lack of clear regulatory obligations, and the ease of using automated 
diagnostic tools to spot accessibility flaws.153 Although serial filing may bring 
about compliance gains, it has been heavily criticized for enabling repeat players 
to force defendants to pay for minor violations.154 In response, Congress and the 
judiciary have endeavored to impose Title III notice requirements that would 
protect defendants from surprise suits.155 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. at 251–52; see Michael Ashley Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People with Disabilities 
Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1681 n.72 
(2010) (noting common practices of serial litigators that include seeking quick settlements and pursu-
ing Title III claims in jurisdictions that have state law analogues providing for awards of compensato-
ry damages). 
 151 Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 14–15. 
 152 Randazzo, supra note 18; see Vu et al., supra note 139 (reporting a 63% rise in ADA Title III filings 
between 2015 and 2016, and an average of over 4,500 Title III suits filed annually in 2014 and 2015). 
 153 Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 2–3; Harbor Freight Complaint, supra note 142, 
at 1–3; Randazzo, supra note 18. A demand letter sent by a group representing disabled individuals to 
a Nebraska restaurant in 2017 underscores the potential for an increase in small-scale, confidential 
web accessibility settlements. See Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 2–3. The group ex-
plained that it filed eighteen web accessibility suits and proposed a confidential settlement under 
which the restaurant would pay the group’s expected attorney’s fees. Id. Although the suit was filed in 
a jurisdiction where there was no district or circuit precedent regarding website accessibility under 
Title III, the restaurant noted that the WCAG “are recognized as setting the baseline requirements for 
website accessibility.” Id. at 4. 
 154 See What’s a Drive-By Lawsuit?, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-americans-with-disabilities-act-lawsuits-anderson-cooper [https://
perma.cc/8RGC-6KEH] (profiling disabled individuals taken advantage of by opportunistic attorneys 
and criticizing serial Title III litigation). 
 155 See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 n.2, 867–68 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 
(finding that a disabled plaintiff was a “vexatious litigant” after he had filed roughly 400 ADA actions 
across California); Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 16–17 (noting legislative and judicial responses to 
mass filings). A 2015 congressional bill proposed a lengthy pre-suit notice requirement on Title III 
actions. See H.R. 3765, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill would have required a disabled individual to 
notify a public accommodation in writing of specific access barriers they faced and then file suit only 
if the public accommodation failed to respond with a plan for remediation within 60 days or failed to 
“make substantial progress” towards remediation within 120 days of having sent a plan. Id. § 4. Addi-
tionally, the bill would have imposed criminal fines for sending demand letters alleging non-specific 
Title III violations. Id. § 3. 
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C. Alternative State-Level and International Web  
Accessibility Enforcement Regimes 
State laws have historically increased civil rights protections beyond feder-
al baselines.156 In the ADA context, states have clarified reasonable accommoda-
tion duties.157 Following this tradition, web accessibility legislation was pro-
posed in Maryland in 2012.158 Also, in the Canadian province of Ontario, web 
accessibility legislation regulating the private sector was passed in 2005 and is 
currently on an implementation schedule ends in 2025.159 
The proposed bill in Maryland would have required commercial websites to 
become accessible to the blind and visually impaired.160 In order to ensure the 
feasibility of implementation, the bill fully exempted businesses generating less 
than one million dollars in annual revenue from coverage.161 By directing com-
plaints to a disability commission, the bill created the possibility for the consoli-
dation of multiple claims against individual websites.162 It also provided for pre-
suit mediation procedures to reduce litigation costs.163 
Supported by substantial regulations and infrastructure, the 2005 Accessi-
bility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (“AODA”) requires large private com-
mercial websites to meet WCAG 2.0 AA web accessibility standards by 2025.164 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 600–01, 633 (2004). 
 157 Id. In the context of making reasonable accommodations for employees under the ADA, state 
laws have quantified general feasibility requirements to clarify the federal baseline. Id. at 633; see, 
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(6) (West 2017) (providing that, if the cost of an accommodation 
for an employee is greater than five percent of a new employee’s annual salary, the accommodation is 
not required). 
 158 H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6), 2012 Leg., 429th Sess. (Md. 2012). Before an omnibus web accessibility 
bill was proposed in Maryland, there was already legislation targeted at providing blind and visually 
impaired students with access to accessible digital textbooks. S.B. 268, 2007 Leg. 423d Sess. (Md. 
2007); Press Release, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Governor O’Malley Signs Landmark Legislation 
Providing for Electronic Access (May 8, 2007), https://nfb.org/node/1070 [https://perma.cc/H24V-
8MNK]. 
 159 See Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, S.O. 2005, c 11, s 1 (Can.) (setting forth 
the purpose and scope of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (“AODA”)); Integrated 
Accessibility Standards, O. Reg. 191/11 s 14 (Can.) (covering web accessibility regulations promul-
gated under the AODA); ISSUE BRIEF, ACCESSIBILITY IN ONTARIO: HOW THE AODA IMPACTS WEB 
AND ONLINE VIDEO 1 (3PlayMedia, 2016) [hereinafter AODA BRIEF] (explaining that, although the 
AODA called for a “giant overhaul of Ontarian infrastructure,” it was designed to be implemented in 
the government first and to then reach businesses over a long period of time). 
 160 Md. H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id.; see Joshua L. Friedman & Gary C. Norman, The Norman/Friedman Principle: Equal 
Rights to Information and Technology Access, 18 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 47, 48 (2012) (suggesting that 
the Maryland legislation would have benefited from a two year “grace period” in which business 
could have come into compliance). 
 164 See S.O. 2005, c 11 (covering the entire AODA); O. Reg. 191/11 s 2 (defining large private 
sector entities as those with fifty or more employees); O. Reg. 191/11 s 14 (setting forth web accessi-
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The legislation creates a tiered implementation timeline that proceeds from the 
government to the public sector and then to large and small private sector enti-
ties.165 Although the AODA gives a government agency the ability to audit busi-
nesses and assess heavy fines, it allows regulated entities to self-report compli-
ance as a first step in enforcement.166 In order to clarify the steps that specific 
entities must take to meet WCAG 2.0 standards, the government of Ontario pro-
vides resources for self-assessment, and information on multi-prong approaches 
to web accessibility that include models for policies, training, awareness, and 
infrastructure.167 
IV. STRUCTURING WEB ACCESSIBILITY ENFORCEMENT 
The combination of consensus web accessibility standards, large-scale liti-
gation efforts, and a receptive judiciary have spurred individual Title III web 
accessibility suits—even in the absence of regulations.168 Accordingly, the cur-
                                                                                                                           
bility requirements under WCAG 2.0 AA); AODA BRIEF, supra note 159, at 7 (laying out AODA 
web accessibility timelines for all covered entities). Under the AODA, stakeholder committees review 
accessibility standards at least once every five years and promulgate new regulations thereafter. S.O. 
2005, c 11, ss 7–9. In order to expand its impact at the local level, the AODA provides that municipal-
ities must establish advisory committees—each comprised of a majority of disabled individuals—to 
collaborate with local government officials in implementation efforts. Id. c 11, s 29. To further ensure 
that the goals of the AODA are being met over time, a government-appointee conducts periodic re-
views that assess the effectiveness of the legislation and its implementing regulations. Id. c 11, s 41; 
2014 AODA REVIEW, supra note 159, at 1. In order to facilitate general awareness of, and compliance 
with the AODA, an office is charged with conducting public education campaigns and consulting with 
regulated entities regarding how to best meet their accessibility obligations. 2014 AODA REVIEW, 
supra note 159, at 8, 10. 
 165 O. Reg. 191/11 s 14; AODA BRIEF, supra note 159, at 7. 
 166 S.O. 2005, c 11, ss 81–83; AODA BRIEF, supra note 159, at 7; see 2014 AODA REVIEW, 
supra note 159, at 8, 10 (describing AODA compliance provisions as a “progressive enforcement 
regime” that starts with mandated self-reporting, utilizes inspection procedures, and concludes with 
fines); see also S.O. 2005, c 11, s 83 (setting maximum fine at $100,000 per day where a corporation 
has committed ongoing and substantial violations of the AODA). Notwithstanding its detailed en-
forcement procedures, evidence suggests that the AODA is under-enforced in the private sector. See 
2014 AODA REVIEW, supra note 159, at 33 (discussing a study conducted in 2013 which found that 
only 30% of the 51,000 small and large private entities that were required to self-report under the 
AODA had done so, and fines had not been assessed). The AODA’s web accessibility requirements 
have also been criticized for creating unclear compliance obligations and for being difficult to imple-
ment due to a lack of adequately trained web accessibility experts. See id. at 28, 30 (noting criticism 
with regard to the vagueness of a safe harbor provision under which website modifications need not be 
made where “not practicable,” and similar criticism over the definition of a “significant [website] 
refresh”). 
 167 AODA BRIEF, supra note 159, at 8; see How to Make Websites Accessible, ONTARIO (Nov. 
17, 2017), https://www.ontario.ca/page/how-make-websites-accessible [https://perma.cc/RWL9-
M44M] (providing entities whose websites are regulated under the AODA with WCAG compliance 
guidelines and a third party’s automated compliance testing tool). 
 168 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 578 (D. Vt. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of 
the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D. Mass. 2012); see 42 C.F.R. § 438.10 (2017) 
(adopting the WCAG 2.0 AA success criteria as the web accessibility standard for the websites of 
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rent enforcement regime is highly unstructured.169 This Part argues that, without 
DOJ regulations, the private enforcement regime is inefficient and generates 
backlash.170 In order to re-route web accessibility under Title III, this Part argues 
for increased litigation by cause lawyers and state attorneys general, and for 
state-level web accessibility legislation.171 Section A of this Part concludes that 
the judiciary is likely to further entrench website accessibility under Title III ra-
ther than limit it according to an anachronistic physical nexus requirement.172 
Section B argues for a more efficient and broad-based website accessibility im-
plementation under Title III through existing templates of disability cause law-
yering, actions by state attorneys general, and state-level legislation.173 
A. Commercial Websites as Title III Public Accommodations 
For two decades, litigation has revealed the negative practical and doctrinal 
consequences of applying Parker’s anachronistic interpretation of Title III to 
include only those commercial websites with a nexus to physical places.174 This 
supports the DOJ’s conclusion that further litigation will tend to yield broad ap-
plication of Title III online.175 When Parker and its progeny construed Title III to 
exclude benefits plans, they asserted a “physical place open to public access” as 
a condition triggering Title III protections.176 The physical place standard, how-
                                                                                                                           
Medicaid providers); 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,883 (requiring 
the websites of commercial airlines to comply with WCAG 2.0 AA); 2016 Proposed Title II Website 
Rule, supra note 6, at 26,663–64 (noting the DOJ’s intention to implement a web accessibility rule for 
state and local entities using the same WCAG 2.0 AA standard). 
 169 See 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,883 (implementing indus-
try-specific web accessibility rule); Integrated Accessibility Standards, O. Reg. 191/11 s 14 (Can.) 
(implementing web accessibility regulations that proceed from the government to the private sector on 
a multi-year timeline); Chamber of Commerce, Comment Letter on 2010 Web Accessibility ANPRM 
for Titles II and III of the ADA at 2, 7, 12–14 (Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 Chamber of Com-
merce Comment] (discussing various difficulties of broadly implementing web accessibility). 
 170 See infra notes 189–198 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 199–217 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 189–217 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1013–14 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title 
III covers physical places of public accommodations to the exclusion of third party insurance provid-
ers and the contents of their plans); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 571 
(D. Vt. 2015) (distinguishing early Title III decisions involving third party insurers from modern 
counterparts involving websites); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318, 
1321 n.13 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (dismissing Title III web accessibility claim against an airline on grounds 
that the plaintiff failed to allege some barrier to a physical place and noting concern regarding the 
absence of codified web accessibility standards). 
 175 See 2010 Hearing, supra note 120, at 17 (noting DOJ’s position that courts would increasingly 
recognize websites as covered under Title III). 
 176 Parker, 121 F. 3d at 1012, 1014. Although private markets and contents of insurance plans 
appeared far outside the ambit of a public accommodations law that covered “ramps and elevators,” the 
Title’s broad mandate contained no obvious public/private or access/content distinctions, and it expressly 
covered “insurance offices.” Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114–15 
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ever, no longer serves as a proxy for public-facing commercial entities.177 Today, 
that standard excludes access to everyday business-to-consumer activity that 
Parker defined as protected by Title III.178 This absurd result has led courts to 
further investigate the purpose and legislative intent behind Title III, which 
strongly indicate broad inclusivity and adaptation to changes in technology—as 
recognized in the Netflix and Scribd decisions.179 Against Title III’s otherwise 
broad coverage, the exclusion of online businesses that bear essential indicia of 
public accommodations imposes an arbitrary limitation on the law.180 
The absence of codified web accessibility standards has also raised con-
cerns regarding implementation costs, and the ability of courts to consistently 
apply Title III to commercial websites without standards.181 The widespread 
adoption of consensus standards demonstrates, however, that those concerns are 
largely unfounded.182 Federal web accessibility regulations employ the same 
                                                                                                                           
(9th Cir. 2000). Grappling with a mandate that did not expressly exclude expansive rights to accessible 
content or private markets, the Parker line of cases relied on noscitur a sociis to generalize a specific list 
of commercial entities and used Title III’s text to circumscribe it according to a then existing prototype of 
a public-facing commercial entity. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 
601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012. 
 177 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012, 1014. 
 178 Id. at 1014; Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575–76. 
 179 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575–76; Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 
196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 108 (1990); Colker, supra note 145, at 
385. The current trend of construing Title III thusly to cover all commercial websites started with a 
court bound to the First Circuit’s expansive holding in Carparts, however, it has since been adopted 
by the court in Scribd, which was not bound to Carparts or the physical nexus requirement. Carparts 
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 
1994); Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575–76. 
 180 Scribd, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 575–76; Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200; see ADA Titles II and III 
2010 ANPRM, supra note 104, at 43,461–62 (discussing the increasing need for websites to be regu-
lated as public accommodations in order to fulfill the purposes of Title III). 
 181 Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 n.13 (S.D. Fla. 2002); The 
Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 51–52 (2000) 
(statement of Walter Olson, Fellow, Manhattan Institute) (noting early practical and legal concerns 
with the application of Title III to the internet in a congressional hearing held in 2000). The district 
court in Access Now relied on Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd. for the proposition that “the 
Eleventh Circuit has recognized Congress’ clear intent that Title III of the ADA governs solely access 
to physical, concrete places of public accommodation.” Id. at 1318 (citing Rendon v. Valleycrest 
Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2002)). On the referenced pages, the Rendon court con-
cluded that Title III’s plain language covered discrimination against the plaintiffs in their homes be-
cause they faced communication barriers to a show that was held in a concrete place. Rendon, 294 
F.3d at 1283–84. Because Title III’s plain language resolved the issue in Rendon, the court did not 
rely on—or mention—congressional intent, and it did not reach any conclusion as to whether the 
ADA encompassed only physical places. Id. The Rendon court’s most direct assertion in this regard 
was in a footnote acknowledging that its holding was consistent with a physical nexus requirement. Id. 
at 1284 n.8. 
 182 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 26,663–64; 2016 Title II Extension 
Notice, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services 
of State and Local Government Entities; Supplemental Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; 
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consensus WCAG 2.0 AA standard.183 The healthcare and airline industries are 
also bound to that standard through their antidiscrimination mandates.184 The 
feasibility of applying Title III to commercial websites is further apparent in 
light of the primacy of WCAG 2.0 AA in Title II and III rulemaking processes, 
and the application of that standard in industry settlements.185 
B. Using Large-Scale Web Accessibility Enforcement Models: Cause 
Lawyering, State Attorney General Actions, and State-Level Laws 
Homogenous Title III lawsuits are not positioned to efficiently increase 
commercial web accessibility because adoption by businesses is time-
consuming, complicated, and must be tailored to their unique operations.186 Two 
currently absent factors are needed to bring about widespread compliance: (1) 
adoption incentives, and (2) gradual implementation requirements.187 This Part 
argues that, to bring about efficient and sustainable adoption, web accessibility 
enforcement should occur through large-scale litigation brought by cause law-
yers and attorneys general, and through state-level legislation built on models 
from Maryland and Ontario.188 
                                                                                                                           
Extension of Comment Period, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,908, 49,908 (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Title II 
Extension Notice]; see 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,887–88. 
 183 See 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,887–88. 
 184 2017 Final Rule on Section 508, supra note 106, at 5791; 2013 Air Carrier Web Accessibility 
Rule, supra note 108, at 67,883; Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, supra note 
116, at 31,426; 2016 Proposed Title II Website Rule, supra note 6, at 26,663–64. 
 185 Sweetgreen Settlement, supra note 135, §§ 6–9; HRB Consent Decree, supra note 135, §§ 12–
15, 18, 20, 23; Scribd-NFB Agreement, supra note 15, at 2, 4–5; see 2010 Hearing, supra note 120, at 
16 (discussing the need for Title II and III web accessibility regulations); 2016 Proposed Title II Web-
site Rule, supra note 6, at 26,663–64 (employing consensus WCAG standards in Title II rulemaking); 
2016 Title II Extension Notice, supra note 182, at 49,908 (noting that a forthcoming Title II web ac-
cessibility rule would serve as the foundation for a similar Title III rule); ADA Titles II and III 2010 
ANPRM, supra note 104, at 43,465 (noting broad consensus around WCAG and considering its appli-
cation to Title III). 
 186 See infra notes 189–196 and accompanying text; see also Randazzo, supra note 18 (discussing 
industry concerns with the current web accessibility enforcement regime under Title III); Raymond, 
supra note 148, at 254 (discussing public accommodation noncompliance with Title III arising out of 
the Title’s limited remedies); Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 139, at 2–3, 4–6 (noting that, after 
a business had begun the process of conforming its website to WCAG 2.0 AA standards, it received a 
demand letter alleging that its website was not Title III compliant); Waterstone, supra note 32, at 447–
49 (noting that “the private attorney general project under the ADA has not gone well” and discussing 
Title III under-enforcement). 
 187 See infra notes 189–198 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 199–217 and accompanying text. Even in the context of private enforcement of 
Title III physical access requirements—for which there are codified regulations—commentators have 
noted the existence of “an enforcement void . . . that the government is best suited to fill.” Waterstone, 
supra note 32, at 475. 
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1. Adoption and Implementation Gaps in Web Accessibility Enforcement 
A second wave of small-scale web accessibility actions are being brought 
against large and small entities across the private sector.189 This creates the po-
tential for popular backlash, and may undermine the progress of traditional 
large-scale enforcement efforts that have helped to create industry standards.190 
With regard to adoption incentives, the lack of codified web accessibility regula-
tions creates uncertainty as to whether the provisions of one small-scale action 
are replicable for similarly situated businesses.191 Compounding this problem, 
small-scale settlements do not stand to spread awareness of more widely appli-
cable compliance practices because they are often confidential.192 Additionally, 
even if there is an overall increase in small scale web accessibility settlements, 
such settlements may not discourage businesses from taking a passive “wait and 
settle” approach to Title III because of the low probability and cost of suit.193 To 
increase the incentives for businesses to make their websites accessible, en-
forcement should be expanded and should promote best practices because this 
would likely lessen litigation over time while increasing the aggregate cost of 
widespread non-compliance.194 
With regard to implementation, small-scale private enforcers are less capa-
ble of monitoring long compliance timelines required for many in the private 
sector.195 Additionally, these enforcers are not likely to shield entities from liabil-
ity when they are either working to comply or simply cannot afford to do so.196 
Accordingly, some ex-ante guidelines are needed to clarify business’ long-term 
web accessibility obligations, taking entity size and industry-specific feasibility 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Vu, supra note 139 (indicating that web accessibility litigation is spreading across a varie-
ty of industries). 
 190 See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 n.2, 868 (indicating judicial 
backlash to Title III physical access suits); H.R. 3765, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing legislation that 
would deter Title III actions by imposing pre-suit notice requirements and banning generalized de-
mand letters); Frank, supra note 132, at 5 (discussing industry-wide impact of 2006 web accessibility 
action brought against Target). 
 191 2010 Hearing, supra note 120, at 2 (statement of Rep. Nadler); 2016 ITI Comment, supra note 
124, at 5–6 (detailing wide variability of web accessibility compliance costs and burdens for different 
types of entities); Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 1–2, 4–6; Randazzo, supra note 18. 
 192 Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 12; Raymond, supra note 148, at 254; see, e.g., Omaha Steaks 
Complaint, supra note 141, at 1–2 (detailing proposed confidential web accessibility settlement); 
Harbor Freight Complaint, supra note 142, at 1–3 (same). 
 193 Raymond, supra note 148, at 254; Waterstone, supra note 37, at 475. 
 194 Bagenstos, supra note 144, at 10; Waterstone, supra note 37, at 447–49. 
 195 Randazzo, supra note 18. Compare Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 3 (noting that 
a web accessibility demand letter contained insubstantial implementation provisions), with Scribd-
NFB Agreement, supra note 15, at 2, 4–5 (detailing an extended implementation timeline in a settle-
ment under which industry leader offering web-based publications agreed to institute accessibility 
policies, create an in-house accessibility position, and collaborate with a disability rights group in 
monitoring compliance). 
 196 Omaha Steaks Complaint, supra note 141, at 3; Randazzo, supra note 18. 
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factors into consideration.197 Cause lawyers, state-level enforcers, and state leg-
islators should step in to promote adoption according to gradual implementation 
timelines that are realistic for the private sector.198 
2. Disability Cause Lawyering and State Attorney General Enforcement 
Cause lawyering stands to increase adoption of commercial web accessibil-
ity among businesses by publicizing major settlements that create industry-
specific standards and require long-term accountability.199 As cause lawyers and 
representative settlements demonstrate, private enforcement can allay the con-
cerns over feasibility that major industry actors raised during the Title II and III 
website rulemaking processes.200 As the multimillion dollar Target litigation il-
lustrated, cause lawyers can also incentivize web accessibility compliance by 
bringing lawsuits in jurisdictions where damages and attorney’s fees are availa-
ble remedies.201 By bringing together disability rights groups and industry stake-
holders, cause lawyers can hold defendants accountable under detailed, long-
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2012) (covering 
Title III feasibility provisions that allow regulated entities to assert cost-related defenses); 2013 Air 
Carrier Web Accessibility Rule, supra note 108, at 67,887, 67,889–90 (setting forth web accessibility 
rules unique to the commercial airline industry); National Restaurant Association and Retail Industry 
Leaders Association, Comment Letter on 2010 Web Accessibility ANPRM for Titles II and III of the 
ADA at 2–3, 13 (Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 Restaurant and Retail Comment] (noting unique 
concerns of the restaurant industry during the Title III web accessibility rulemaking process and sug-
gesting that small businesses be permitted to assert good faith compliance defenses in light of prior 
experience with lawsuits asserting de minimus Title III physical access violations). 
 198 See 2014 AODA REVIEW, supra note 159, at 8, 10 (discussing incremental enforcement 
mechanisms under Ontario web accessibility law); Friedman & Norman, supra note 163, at 79–80 
(discussing proposed web accessibility law in Maryland that would have channeled enforcement 
through a disabilities commission); Kerr, supra note 133 (discussing a structured settlement agree-
ment reached between web-based video provider and disability rights group); Hotel Settlement, supra 
note 138 (detailing agreement reached between an attorney general and a web-based travel service 
following an investigation). 
 199 Class Settlement Agreement and Release, supra note 127, §§ 6–8; Waterstone et al., supra 
note 132, at 1315; ETrade Settlement, supra note 134. 
 200 2016 Internet Association Comment, supra note 124, at 5 (proposing three-year implementa-
tion timeline under WCAG 2.0 AA standard); 2010 Chamber of Commerce Comment, supra note 169, 
at 5–6, 12–13 (noting industry concerns with web accessibility rule such as coverage of archived and 
third party content on pages that would be costly to remediate); Waterstone et al., supra note 132, at 
1316 (discussing strategy of setting industry-wide standards); Scribd-NFB Agreement, supra note 15 
(implementing industry-specific terms and extended implementation timeline in settlement agree-
ment). 
 201 Waterstone et al., supra note 132, at 1301; see 2012 Netflix Consent Decree § 3, supra note 
86, at 3 (requiring web-based video provider to pay $755,000 in attorney’s fees per the terms of a web 
accessibility settlement with a disability rights group); Class Settlement Agreement and Release, su-
pra note 127, §§ 11, 14 (requiring retailer to pay $6 million in damages and $3 million in fees as part 
of web accessibility class action settlement). 
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term settlement agreements.202 Such collaborative implementation processes 
ensure that settlement agreements contain compliance timelines and practices 
that can serve as models for other businesses.203 
State attorney general actions highlight how state-level intervention can 
spur increased adoption and implementation of web accessibility guidelines that 
go even further than large-scale private enforcement.204 Unlike private enforce-
ment actions—which are costly, zero-sum, and adversarial—state attorneys gen-
eral are able to distribute costs to the public and work collaboratively with busi-
nesses to institute compliance measures for the benefit of the public benefit.205 
Furthermore, because state investigations do not rely on attorney’s fees or re-
quire lengthy litigation, they can be instituted in greater numbers and on a more 
expedited basis.206 Finally, unlike private enforcement actions that focus on one 
individual or a representative group of individuals with a specific issue, states 
can investigate and remediate many aspects of Title III website non-
compliance.207 State-level enforcement thus appears to be the best existing sub-
stitute in the absence of federal regulations.208 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See, e.g., ETrade Settlement, supra note 134 (providing for a multi-month web accessibility 
implementation timeline and industry-specific terms in settlement agreement with ETrade, a web-
based financial services company). 
 203 Frank, supra note 132, at 5; Waterstone et al., supra note 132, at 1315. 
 204 See Waterstone, supra note 37, at 487, 491–92 (noting that the ADA requires “distributive 
justice” because it spreads remediation costs across society to entities that have not engaged in any 
form of invidious discrimination, and arguing that public enforcement is therefore well-suited to the 
ADA); Hotel Settlement, supra note 138 (discussing how a specialized bureau of a state attorney 
general’s office set web accessibility standards for the travel industry after conducting investigations 
into two major web-based industry leaders). 
 205 See Waterstone, supra note 37, at 476–77, 487 (noting that the ADA is conducive to collabo-
rative enforcement because non-compliance is often not associated with culpability); Hotel Settle-
ment, supra note 138 (discussing collaboration between travel industry leaders and attorney general’s 
office in reaching web accessibility settlement agreement). 
 206 Waterstone, supra note 37, at 476 (noting that “structural limitations” to private enforcement 
of Title III, such as its limited remedies, can be avoided where actions are pursued by governmental 
actors); Monster Settlement, supra note 137 (discussing year-long collaboration between a state attor-
ney general, disability rights group, and web-based employment service in implementing web accessi-
bility). 
 207 See Waterstone, supra note 37, at 476 (noting that, whereas individuals and classes with dis-
crete disabilities are “tied to inefficient piecemeal litigation,” the government can remediate “all facets 
of inaccessibility” that are discovered during an ADA investigation of a covered entity). Compare 
HSBC Settlement, supra note 135 (explaining that the state attorney general and a banking industry 
leader reached a comprehensive web accessibility agreement ensuring access for individuals with 
hearing and vision disabilities after a blind individual notified the state that she could not access a 
service of the bank which required her to complete a written form), with 2012 Netflix Consent Decree, 
supra note 86, §§ 1–3 (setting forth terms of agreement between Netlflix, a web-based video provider, 
and a group representing individuals with hearing disabilities, under which the provider agreed to 
increase the accessibility of its services to the class of individuals represented by the advocacy group). 
 208 Waterstone, supra note 37, at 476. 
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3. Web Accessibility Regulation Through State Legislation 
State legislation to address Title III’s regulatory gap would help to consoli-
date a scattershot private enforcement regime by clarifying web accessibility 
standards.209 The proposed and enacted pieces of legislation in Maryland and 
Ontario addressed many of the current adoption and implementation challenges 
and they serve as a template for future state legislation that should address those 
challenges.210 For states that have already adopted consensus website accessibil-
ity standards in their government agencies, legislation would transition website 
accessibility policy from the public to the private sector.211 
By backing a web accessibility requirement with the force of state law, the 
Maryland bill would have created a clear adoption incentive for regulated enti-
ties and gradual implementation that addressed small business concerns.212 Go-
ing even further towards structured enforcement, the 2005 AODA in Ontario 
provides a template for comprehensive state-level website accessibility regula-
tion that addresses feasibility and accountability through a twenty-year imple-
mentation scheme.213 Rather than being regulated by firms that employ compli-
ance testing tools to impose liability for minor violations, the AODA places 
                                                                                                                           
 209 H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6), 2012 Leg. 429th Sess. (Md. 2012); Friedman & Norman, supra note 163, 
at 79–80 (discussing the possibility of consolidating claims in a central commission under proposed 
web accessibility bill in Maryland); Long, supra note 156, at 600–01, 633 (noting the tradition of 
federal civil rights expansion through state law and ability of state law to clarify reasonable accom-
modation requirements). 
 210 See Md. H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6) (exempting small businesses from proposed web accessibility 
bill); 2010 Restaurant and Retail Comment, supra note 197, at 1–2, 13 (discussing concerns over Title 
III web accessibility regulations burdening small businesses); see also 2016 ITI Comment, supra note 
124, at Question 11 (proposing exemption from WCAG audio description requirement under forth-
coming Title II web accessibility rule, and relying on similar exemption contained in the Ontario web 
accessibility regulations). 
 211 See MINN. STAT. § 16E.03 (2017) (setting forth public sector web accessibility law in Minne-
sota). 
 212 Md. H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6); Friedman & Norman, supra note 163, at 79–80. Notably, the ADA 
provides that the Attorney General may certify a state law as ADA compliant where the law prescribes 
accessibility requirements that are more specific than those set forth in the federal statute. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12188(b)(ii) (2012). The relevant provision of the ADA creates a procedure through which the At-
torney General consults with the Access Board—the standard-setter for the ADA—in the certification 
process. Id. Although the provision contemplates “local building codes” as candidates for certification 
along with state laws, it is in not limited to physical accessibility standards. Id. Considering that the 
Access Board created web accessibility standards requiring federal government websites to comply 
with WCAG 2.0 AA under § 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, it appears that a state commercial web 
accessibility law could be certified as ADA compliant. Id.; 2017 Final Rule on Section 508, supra 
note 106, at 5791. Once a state accessibility law is certified, compliance with that law can serve to 
rebut an allegation of non-compliance in an enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(ii). 
 213 See Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, S.O. 2005, c 11 (Can.) (laying out provi-
sions of the AODA); O. Reg. 191/11 s 14 (detailing a multi-year web accessibility implementation 
timeline that proceeds from the public sector to the private sector, and exempts small businesses from 
coverage); see also S.O. 2005, c 11, ss 7–9 (providing for period updates of regulations by committees 
comprised of stakeholders from the government, diverse industries, and the disabled community). 
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these tools in the hands of regulated parties and tiers their obligations according 
to business size.214 
The proposed web accessibility legislation in Maryland and the AODA il-
lustrate the possibility for states to fill the current Title III regulatory gap and 
provide a model for future federal regulations.215 State legislation should create 
adoption incentives by escalating enforcement and should aim for gradual im-
plementation by creating safe harbors as well as long-term monitoring, training, 
and information-sharing requirements.216 States should create structured web 
accessibility enforcement regimes both to provide clarity, raise awareness re-
garding compliance and, crucially, to increase web accessibility for disabled in-
dividuals.217 
CONCLUSION 
Title III of the ADA is poised to provide web accessibility to millions of 
disabled individuals through private enforcement actions. Title III guarantees 
the right to web accessibility because it demands equal access to the main-
stream economy. Moreover, the law’s core promise belies any exclusion of 
web-based businesses based on anachronistic interpretations that limit it to 
physical places. Without website regulations under Title III, however, progress 
towards accessibility is at a crossroads. The prospects for widespread, sustain-
able compliance are diminished when placed in the hands of private law firms 
pursuing scattershot settlements and undertaking piecemeal litigation. Unlike 
traditional large-scale enforcement efforts, the second wave of web accessibil-
ity litigation does not fill the regulatory gap by targeting industry leaders or 
creating replicable implementation models. Cause lawyering, state action, and 
state law should therefore step in to create a structured enforcement regime 
that would achieve the ADA’s broad guarantee of web accessibility. 
DANIEL SORGER 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Harbor Freight Complaint, supra note 142, at 1–3 (proposing a web accessibility settlement 
based on results of an automated test that showed non-compliance with WCAG standards); AODA 
BRIEF, supra note 159, at 8 (discussing automated testing tools and other government-provided aids 
for private sector web accessibility implementation under the AODA). 
 215 Md. H.B. 183 §§ (E), (6); S.O. 2005, c 11; Friedman & Norman, supra note 163, at 79–80; 
Long, supra note 156, at 600–01. 
 216 See 2014 AODA REVIEW, supra note 159, at 8, 10 (discussing enforcement regime under 
AODA that relies on self-reporting before imposing fines for non-compliance); How to Make Web-
sites Accessible, supra note 167. 
 217 2010 Hearing, supra note 120, at 2 (statement of Rep. Nadler); Randazzo, supra note 18; see 
ADA Titles II and III 2010 ANPRM, supra note 104, at 43,462 (noting that millions of Americans 
face barriers to web accessibility that can be feasibly removed across the private sector). 
